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What determines who wins a civil war? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative 'distance' between the group leadership and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: fighting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the fighter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Different assumptions about the distribution of potential fighters along the relevant dimension of conflict lead to different equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Focusing on the Colombian armed conflict, this paper develops for the first time a within-country analysis of violence duration. It examines a wide range of factors potentially associated with violence duration at the municipal level for the period 1988-2004, including geographic factors, economic and social variables, institutional characteristics, victimization variables and government intervention. It individuates the most robust correlates of the persistence of localized conflict, both across specifications and using different econometric models of duration analysis. Results suggest that violence in Colombia is more persistent in places where illegal rents are available. Better quality institutions and a more active military are in turn associated with shorter conflict episodes. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

The growing empirical literature on the analysis of civil war has recently included the study of conflict duration at the cross-country level. This paper presents, for the first time, a within-country analysis of the determinants of violence duration. I focus on the experience of the Colombian armed conflict. While the conflict has been active for about five decades, local violence ebbs and flows and areas experiencing continuous conflict coexist with places that have been able to resile and where violence is mostly absent. I examine a wide range of factors potentially associated with violence duration at the municipal level, including scale variables, geographical conditions, economic and social variables, institutions and state presence, inequality, government intervention, and victimization variables. I characterize a few variables robustly correlated with the persistence of localized conflict, both across specifications and using different econometric models of duration analysis.

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression-driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. © 2011 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.

Colombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia's puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia's independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms' ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia's current peace-building efforts.